What enables individuals to act together? Recent discoveries suggest that a variety of mechanisms are involved. But something fundamental is yet to be investigated. In joint action, agents represent a collective goal, or so it is often assumed. But how, if at all, are collective goals represented in joint action and how do such representations impact performance? To investigate this question we adapted a bimanual paradigm, the circle-line drawing paradigm, to contrast two agents acting in parallel with two agents performing a joint action. Participants were required to draw lines or circles while observing circles or lines being drawn. The findings indicate that interpersonal motor coupling may occur in joint but not parallel action. This suggests that participants in joint actions can represent collective goals motorically.
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Introduction
What enables individuals to act together? People walk, play games and draw together. Joint actions such as these are thought to involve a variety of mechanisms (Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011) . For instance, walking together, as well as joint actions involving music or dance, may be achieved in part thanks to entrainment, the process of synchronizing two or more rhythmic behaviours with respect to phase (Nessler & Gilliland, 2009) . Entrainment can occur without any intention to coordinate (Varlet, Bucci, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2015) or even despite individuals attempting not to coordinate their actions (Issartel, Marin, & CadopiM 2007; Ulzen et al., 2008) .
Nonrhythmic joint actions can be coordinated by representations concerning others' tasks which can modulate performance of one's own task, facilitating or impairing it (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003 , 2005 . For instance, which flankers distract a subject can depend not only on her own task but also on her co-actor's task (Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011) . Likewise, how stimuli such as words are processed can also depend on their relevance to a coactor's task (Baus et al., 2014) . Many joint actions have rhythmic and nonrhythmic aspects; coordination of such actions may involve both entrainment and representations concerning others' tasks (van der Wel & Fu, 2015) .
While these mechanisms are plausibly critical for enabling individuals to act together, something fundamental is missing from this picture of joint action. In joint action, agents represent not only each individual's tasks but also a collective goal; or so it is often held (Bratman, 2014; Searle, 1990; Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010) . A collective goal is an outcome to which two or more actions are directed where this is not, or not only, a matter of each action individually being directed to that outcome (Butterfill, 2016) . But how, if at all, are collective goals represented in joint action? And, if they are, how do such representations impact performance in joint action? To date little research has directly addressed these questions. The aim of the present paper is to begin filling this gap.
Previous findings indicate that in joint actions such as playing a piano duet, clinking glasses, jumping together and moving an object, agents' motor representations and processes take into account relations between their own actions and others' in preparing and monitoring their actions (Kourtis, Knoblich, Wozniak, & Sebanz, 2014; Loehr et al., 2013; Meyer, van der Wel, & Hunnius, 2013; Tsai, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Vesper, van der Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013) . These findings motivated us to conjecture that participants in joint actions can represent collective goals motorically. Because representing a collective goal (or any goal) triggers motor processes concerning actions that should bring the http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.04.008 0010-0277/Ó 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
